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ABSTRACT
For decades, the Democrats have been viewed as the party of the poor, with the
Republicans representing the rich. Recent presidential elections, however, have
shown a reverse pattern, with Democrats performing well in the richer blue states
in the northeast and coasts, and Republicans dominating in the red states in the
middle of the country and the south. Through multilevel modeling of individual-
level survey data and county- and state-level demographic and electoral data, we
reconcile these patterns.
Furthermore, we ﬁnd that income matters more in red America than in blue
America. In poor states, rich people are much more likely than poor people to vote
for the Republican presidential candidate, but in rich states (such as Connecticut),
income has a very low correlation with vote preference.
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Key methods used in this research are: (1) plots of repeated cross-sectional anal-
yses, (2) varying-intercept, varying-slope multilevel models, and (3) a graph that
simultaneously shows within-group and between-group patterns in a multilevel
model. These statistical tools help us understand patterns of variation within and
between states in a way that would not be possible from classical regressions or by
looking at tables of coefﬁcient estimates.
Keywords: Availability heuristic; ecological fallacy; hierarchical model; income and
voting; multilevel model; presidential elections; public opinion; secret
weapon; varying-slope model.
I never said all Democrats are saloon-keepers. What I said is that all saloon-
keepers are Democrats.
—Horace Greeley, 1860
Pat doesn’t have a mink coat. But she does have a respectable Republican
cloth coat.
—Richard Nixon, 1952
Like upscale areas everywhere, from Silicon Valley to Chicago’s North
Shore to suburban Connecticut, Montgomery County supported the
Democratic ticket in last year’s presidential election, by a margin of 63
percent to 34 percent.
—David Brooks, 2001
There is, for example, this large class of afﬂuent professionalswho are solidly
Democratic. DataQuick Information Systems recently put out a list of 100
ZIP code areas where the median home price was above $500,000. By my
count, at least 90 of these places — from the Upper West Side to Santa
Monica — elect liberal Democrats.
—David Brooks, 2004
A lot of Bush’s red zones can be traced to wealthy enclaves or sun-belt
suburbs where tax cuts are king.
—Matt Bai, 2001
But in the Ipsos-Reid surveys, 38% of voters in “strong Bush” counties said
that they had household incomes below $30,000, while 7% said that their
families earned at least $100,000. In “strong Gore” counties, by contrast,
only 29% of voters pegged their household income below $30,000, while
14% said that it was above $100,000.
—James Barnes, 2002
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DEMOCRATS AND REPUBLICANS, RICH, AND POOR:
TWO PERSPECTIVES
Throughout the 20th century and even before, theDemocratic Party in theUnited States
has been viewed as representing the party of the lower classes and thus, by extension, the
“average American.” More recently, however, a different perspective has taken hold, in
which theDemocrats represent the elites rather than themasses. The view of Democrats
as elitists began perhaps with the party’s control over government planning during the
New Deal era and was developed as a key theme by populist Republicans in the postwar
period, including Nixon, Goldwater, and Reagan.1 The Democratic party too has had
many prominent populists, from Huey Long to Harry Truman to Jimmy Carter to
Al Gore (“the people versus the powerful”), but this is less remarkable given its majority
status during this period. Throughout, populism has been associated with the attitudes
and interests of lower and middle-income Americans.
What is happening now? Do richer voters still support Republicans? If so, how can
we understand the pattern that the Democratic do best in the richer blue states of the
Northeast andWest, while the Republicans dominate in the poorer red states in the south
and between the coasts? And does living in a poor or rich state change individual vote
preferences in some fashion? In other words, does context matter for individual voting
behavior and, if so, how? We explore these questions by studying the relation between
income and presidential vote preference, at the individual, county, and state levels. It
turns out that the connections between income and voting in the United States are not
simple; we ﬁnd that rich and poor states differ in the relation between individual income
and partisan preferences.
Perspectives from Social Science and the News Media
Census and opinion poll data since 1952 reveal that higher-income voters continue to
support the Republicans in presidential elections.2 However, higher-income states have
in recent years favored the Democrats. The Republicans have the support of the richer
voters within any given state but have more overall support in the poorer states. Thus,
the identiﬁcation of rich states with rich voters, or more generally, the “personiﬁcation”
of so-called red and blue states, is misleading. For example, in the context of the Brooks
quotes above, within an “upscale” area that supports the Democrats, the more “upscale”
voters are still likely to vote Republican.
The connection between income and support for conservative parties has long been
noted and has attracted interest from political scientists and sociologists studying ideo-
logical polarization. McCarty et al. (2006) argue that partisanship and presidential vote
1 See, for example, Buckley and Bozell (1954), Rovere (1959), McGirr (2001), Perlstein (2002), and
Greenberg (2003).
2 For example, from 2004 exit polls, Bush received 36% of the support of voters with incomes under
$15,000, 41%with incomes between $15,000 and $30,000,monotonically increasing to 62%of those
with incomes over $200,000.
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choice have become more stratiﬁed by income over the past 50 years. Comparing survey
respondents in the highest and lowest quintiles of income, they ﬁnd that in 1956 and
1960, the proportion of Republican identiﬁers was only slightly higher in the highest than
in the lowest quintile, but in 1992–2000, respondents in the highest quintile were more
than twice as likely to identify as a Republican than were those in the lowest. Stonecash
(2000, 2005) ﬁnds a growth of support for the Democrats since the 1970s among poor
persons and in high-poverty areas. In contrast, Fiorina et al. (2005) ﬁnd polarization of
the political class but not of the general voting population, with only small differences in
issue preferences when comparing voters in red and blue states. Fiorina et al., however,
do not discuss voting in relation to income, so our analysis supplements theirs by con-
sidering this variable. In an extensive analysis of opinion poll data, Ansolabehere et al.
(2006) ﬁnd voters to be most strongly motivated by economic issues, but they note that
the connection between income and economic views can be weak. Brooks and Brady
(1999) and Bartels (2006) ﬁnd that income continues to be predictive of partisanship,3
and Filer et al. (1993) studied the connection between income and voter turnout.
In contrast, media attention has focused on comparisons of states (and, to a lesser
extent, counties), as illustrated by many of the quotations that lead off this article. We
seek to simultaneously understandRepublican strength among richer votes and in poorer
states, and to study these trends over time. The journalists who see patterns on the red-
and-blue map and the political scientists who analyze polls are talking past each other
because they are looking at different levels of aggregation. Public perceptions of the two
parties are important, and after setting the record straight on what is actually happening
with income and voting, we consider some explanations from cognitive psychology for
why misunderstandings about the correlations between income and vote preference
could persist among otherwise well-informed observers.
Studying Patterns at the State Level
Comparing to previous studies of income and voting, our key contribution is to study
patterns both within and between states, with both individual income and state-level
income as predictors, using survey data on individuals and election and Census data for
states and counties. The pattern that richer states support the Democrats is not a simple
aggregation of rich voters supporting the Democrats. This can be viewed either as a
debunking of the journalistic image of rich latte Democrats and poor Nascar Repub-
licans — or as support for the journalistic images of political and cultural differences
between red and blue states — differences which are not explained by differences in
individuals’ incomes.
3 Manza and Brooks (1999, Chapter 3) show that the consistent correlation of high income with
Republican vote masks changes in particular social and occupational groups (for example, profes-
sionals havemoved toward theDemocrats and self-employed persons toward the Republicans); here
we focus on income, partly because of its relevance for government policy but especially because of
its salience in current political discourse, an issue we return to at the end of this article.
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We ﬁnd that income matters more in red America than in blue America. In poor
states, rich people are much more likely than poor people to vote for the Republican
presidential candidate, but in rich states (such as Connecticut), income has almost no
correlation with vote preference. The United States has red and blue voters, and red
and blue states, but income cuts across them in different ways (a point noted by Alford
(1963), in his study of social class and voting by region of the United States). As we
demonstrate, the statistical technique of multilevel modeling allows us to understand
the relation between income and vote among individuals, counties, and states. The ﬁnal
section of this article considers reasons for these patterns, along with psychological
reasons why certain misunderstandings have persisted, and a discussion of the relevance
of income/voting patterns to political perceptions.
The patterns of income and voting by state are politically important, and the common
misperceptions of these patterns are also important. This article attempts to make sense
of the data and also the misperceptions.
STUDYING THE RELATION BETWEEN INCOME AND VOTE
PREFERENCES
Survey data show a small but persistent correlation between income and support for the
Republican party, but at the aggregate level, it is the Democrats who do better in the
richer states. Our strategy to understand these patterns is to study the relation between
income and voting in four ways:
• Aggregate, by state: to what extent do richer states favor the Democrats?
• Nationally, at the level of the individual voter: to what extent do richer voters
support the Republicans?
• Individual voters within states: to what extent do richer voters support the Repub-
licans, within any given state? In other words, how much does context matter?
• Counties within states: to what extent do richer counties favor the Democrats,
within any given state?
Patterns at these four levels havemuch different political interpretations from those sup-
posed by confused political commentators. Most notably, the support for the Democrats
in the richer states had led observers to view the typical Democrat as an upper-middle-
class resident of a coastal metropolitan area, and the typical Republican as lower-middle-
class and rural (see Brooks (2001)). That these claims have been overstated (see Frank
(2004), and Issenberg (2004)) does not seem to lessen their appeal.
Amultilevel strategy in understanding voting behavior is useful because we care about
election outcomes as well as individual decisions. Elections are not simple cumulations of
voter decisions (because of institutional features such as electoral rules and geographic
boundaries, and the political decisions of parties and candidates), and so aggregate
analysis should not be discarded simply by citing the ecological fallacy problem (Wright
1989). Trends of economic voting at multiple levels of analysis may ormay not be similar,
and their causes may or may not be similar.
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As in Wright (1989), we consider the variation at each level of analysis. Income varies
far more within states than average income does between states. Consequently, it is the
within-state rather than the between-state effect of income that dominates the national
patterns. In particular, a positive correlation of income and Republican voting within
states, plus a negative correlation between states, combine to form a positive correlation
among all voters.
We have both individual and aggregate data on income and votes. Thus, the statistical
analysis is relativelystraightforward,without thewell-knownproblemsthatcanarisewhen
only aggregate data are available (Robinson 1950, Kramer 1983). For aggregate patterns,
we use presidential election returns and Bureau of Economic Affairs data on average
incomebystateandcounty.Weestimate therelationsbetweenincomeandvotepreferences
for each presidential election from 1968 to 2004, with a particular goal of studying trends
including any changes over time in the support for particular political parties.
For all the analyses, both simple and complex, we gain insight by replicating over
several election years. Although obvious, this sort of replication is not always done, and
when it is done, the resultingpile of analyses can seem too overwhelming to display.Time-
series plots of data summaries and parameter estimates (as in many of the ﬁgures here)
and repeated graphs (also called “small multiples”; see Bertin (1967) and Tufte (1990))
allow us to see patterns in a way that would be difﬁcult using tabular representations
(see Gelman et al. (2002)).4
Analysis of State and County Averages
We begin by ﬁtting a state-level linear regression for each election year, predicting state
support for the Republican candidate in the election from the average income in the
state. Positive coefﬁcients imply that richer states are supporting the Republicans more.
To allow comparability over time, we adjust incomes in each year to 1996 dollars. In
addition, we examine the coefﬁcient of average income after controlling for percent
African–American in the state. We also study average income and votes at the county
level: within states, do the richer counties lean toward the Republicans or theDemocrats?
National Analysis of Individual Voters
Our ﬁrst individual-level analysis is a simple logistic regressionmodeling vote preference
from the National Election Study (NES) polls taken during the month before each elec-
tion (coding 1=Republican, 0=Democrat, excluding respondents whowere undecided
4 The method of repeated modeling, followed by time-series plots of estimates, is called the “secret
weapon” (Gelman and Hill 2007) because it is so easy and powerful but yet rarely used as a data-
analytic tool. We suspect that one reason for its rarity of use is that, once one acknowledges the
time-series structure of a dataset, it is natural to want to take the next step and model that directly.
In practice, however, there is a broad range of problems for which a cross-sectional analysis is
informative, and for which a time-series display is appropriate to give a sense of trends. In our
example, the secret weapon allows us to see how cross-sectional estimates for individual states and
the entire United States vary over time. Expanding our multilevel models to include time series
would be a major research undertaking that would require evaluation of additional time-series
assumptions that are peripheral to our substantive research goals here.
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or supported third-party candidates) on income. We summarize family income with a
ﬁve-point quantile-based scale5 used by the NES, which allows the results to be compa-
rable over time. (However, individual income inequality has grown in recent decades, so
coefﬁcients for percentiles do not have a constant interpretation in terms of numerical
relative incomes.)
Weﬁt a separate logistic regression for each election year; if the coefﬁcients are positive,
this implies that Republicans were differentially supported by richer voters. We also
see what happens when state indicators are included in the model, to see the predictive
power of individual income within states. In addition, we examine the coefﬁcient of
income when additional predictors are added, including ethnicity (African–American
or other), sex, age (18–29, 30–44, 45–64, or 65+), education, party identiﬁcation, and
ideology. However, our primary analyses use only income as a predictor, because our goal
is to study differences between richer and poorer voters. Even if income effects were
“explained” by other predictors, the correlations would still be real.
Analysis of Individuals within States
To study the relation of income to individual vote preferences, controlling for state, we ﬁt
from each election year’s poll data6 a multilevel logistic regression of vote preference on
income (using the ﬁve-point scale noted in Footnote 5) and state. This varying-intercept
model gives us 50 state-level coefﬁcients allowing geographic variation in support for
the Republican candidate in each election.7 The coefﬁcient for income then represents
the extent to which Republicans are differentially supported by richer voters, within any
given state.
Because we are interested in comparing states in different regions and of different
income levels, we include region indicators and the average income within each state
as group-level predictors. Including these predictor also increases the precision of the
multilevel model ﬁt, by reducing the residual error at the state level. As in the national
poll analyses, we also examine the coefﬁcients for income when ethnicity, sex, and age
are included in the model. In addition, we consider models including the state-level Gini
index to account for income inequality within states. We ﬁt the multilevel models using
5 The National Election Study uses 1 = 0–16 percentile, 2 = 17–33 percentile, 3 = 34–67 percentile,
4 = 68–95 percentile, and 5 = 96–100 percentile. We label these as −2,−1, 0, 1, 2, centering at zero
so that we can more easily interpret the intercept terms of regressions that include income as a
predictor.
6 For 2000 and 2004, we ﬁt using the National Annenberg Election Survey, which, with over 100,000
respondents, allows accurate estimation of the patterns in individual states. We also use news
media exit polls: ABC News in 1984 and 1988, Voter Research and Surveys in 1992, Voter News
Service in 1996 and 2000, and National Election Pool in 2004. These polls have disadvantage of a
messier sampling scheme and use different income categories than the Annenberg andNES surveys.
However, the exit polls have large sample sizes (even in small states) and provide an independent
source of data with which to check our results.
7 See Datta et al. (1999) for a similar analysis and Kreft and De Leeuw (1998), Snijders and Bosker
(1999), and Raudenbush and Bryk (2002) for further discussion of multilevel models; and Gelman
and Little (1997), Park et al. (2004), and Gelman and Hill (2007) for multilevel modeling of vote-
preference data.
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the lmer() function in the open-source statistical software package R (R Project 2000)
and the Bayesian software package Bugs (Spiegelhalter et al. 1994, 2004) as linked from
R (Sturtz et al. 2005).
We shall also ﬁt varying-intercept, varying-slope models for individual income, but
we defer these to the next section, following a thorough exploration of the models
described so far.
RESULTS
Richer States Now Support the Democrats
We ﬁrst present the comparison of red and blue states — more formally, regressions of
Republican share of the two-party presidential vote on state average per-capita income.
Figure 1(a) shows that, since the 1976 election, there has been a steady downward trend
in the income coefﬁcient over time. As time has gone on, richer states have increasingly
favored the Democrats. So far, this ﬁts with the “David Brooks” story of increasing elite
support for the left, rather than the “Horace Greeley” story of elite support for the right.
Rich, blue states such as California and NewYork are voting for Democratic presidential
candidates, while poorer, red states like Alabama and Mississippi are voting Republican.
For the past 20 years, the same patterns appear when ﬁtting southern and non-southern
states separately (Figures 1(b) and (c)).
There has been a trend of richer states supporting the Democrats. It makes sense that
the red/blue issue has been more widely discussed in recent years, as this pattern has
become increasingly clear.
Wehypothesized that some of this variation could be explained by inequality.However,


























































Figure 1. (a) Coefﬁcients for average state income (in tens of thousands of 1996 dollars)
in regressions predicting Republican vote share by state. The model w ﬁt separately for
each election year. Estimates and standard errors are shown. (b, c) Same model but ﬁt
separately to southern and non-southern states each year. In recent years, Republicans
have done better in poor states than in rich states.











































Figure 2. Coefﬁcients and standard errors for income in logistic regressions of Repub-
lican vote, ﬁt to NES data from each year. The positive coefﬁcients indicate that higher-
income voters have consistently supported the Republicans, a pattern that holds both
within and outside the South.
found the coefﬁcients for the Gini index to be essentially zero, and there was little change
in the coefﬁcients for state income.
Richer Voters Continue to Support the Republicans Overall
and within States
We ﬁt a logistic regression to the reported Republican presidential vote preference on
personal income, ﬁt separately to each presidential election since 1952. Figure 2 shows
that higher-income people have been consistently more likely to vote Republican, espe-
cially since 1970.
We also ﬁt the model controlling for states by ﬁtting a multilevel logistic regression
to each election year’s NES data, with the 5-point income scale as an individual-level
predictor and states as the groups.8 The estimated coefﬁcients for individual income
over time looks much like Figure 2, implying that, on average, richer voters within states
support the Republicans. When ethnicity, sex, education, and age are included in the
model, the estimated coefﬁcient for income decreases but still clearly remains positive.
Richer Counties Support the Republicans in Some States
and the Democrats in Others
Richer counties used to support the Republicans, but this pattern has steadily declined to
zero during the past 40 years. Patterns vary by region, however. In most southern states,
rich counties voted for Republicans in the past and continue to do so. The southern states
that support the Republicans most strongly show the highest coefﬁcients — that is, the
8 The NES uses cluster sampling and so, strictly speaking, the states in this analysis actually repre-
sent collections of sampled clusters. By ignoring the cluster sampling in the analysis, we may be
understating standard errors. We are not so worried about this issue here because the results show
a consistent pattern over time.
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strongest relations between county income and Republican vote share. In contrast, in
the western states, richer counties once tended to vote Republican, but now increasingly
vote for Democrats (that is, the coefﬁcients in the plots for these states are now negative).
Trends in the midwest and northeast are more mixed.
Another way to understand these patterns is to compare counties within richer blue
Democratic-leaning states and poorer red Republican-leaning states. In deep-red south-
ern states such as Oklahoma, Texas, and Mississippi, the richer counties support the
Republicans and poorer counties support the Democrats. In contrast, consider the states
nearest major national media: New York, Maryland, Virginia, and California. In these
particular states, the richer counties showed a slight tendency to support the Democrats.
Thus, amusingly, national journalists have noticed a pattern (richer counties support-
ing the Democrats) that is concentrated in the states where these journalists live. For
example, Brooks (2001) compared a rich county in Maryland to a poor county in Penn-
sylvania. Had he compared counties within states such as Oklahoma, he would likely
have noticed an opposite pattern.
MODELING STATE-LEVEL DIFFERENCES IN INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL
PATTERNS
Reconciling the Individual and Aggregate Results
Many observers have been misled by the seemingly contradictory pattern of richer states
supporting Democrats but richer voters supporting Republicans. As we have seen with
our hierarchical model, richer voters support Republicans within states as well as overall;
thus direct comparisons of voters for the two parties do not ﬁt the red–blue stereotype.
However, the income and voting differences between red and blue states are real.
To better visualize this puzzling pattern, we construct a graph that simultaneously
displays variation within and between states. Figure 3 shows three lines, representing the
probability of support for Bush in 2000 and 2004 for each of the ﬁve income categories
in each of three states — Connecticut (the richest state, which supported Gore and then
Kerry), Ohio (an intermediate state, which was closely contested), and Mississippi (the
poorest state, which supported Bush). The three lines show the estimated probability
from the multilevel logistic regression (the lines are, in fact, portions of logistic curves,
shifted by different amounts corresponding to the varying intercept in the model).
Figure 3 shows a statistical resolution of the red–blue paradox. Within each state,
income is positively correlated with Republican vote choice, but average income varies by
state. For each of the three states in the plot, the open circles show the relative proportion
of households in each income category (as compared to national averages), and the solid
circle shows the average income level and estimated average support for Bush in the
state. The Bush-supporting states have more lower-income people, and as a result there
is a negative correlation between average state income and state support for Bush, even
amid the positive slope for each state. The poor people in red (Republican-leaning)
states tend to be Democrats; the rich people in blue (Democrat-leaning) states tend to













































Figure 3. The paradox is no paradox. From the multilevel logistic regression model ﬁt
to Annenberg poll data from 2000 to 2004: probability of supporting Bush as a function
of income category, for a rich state (Connecticut), a middle-income state (Ohio), and a
poor state (Mississippi). The open circles show the relative proportion (as compared to
national averages) of households in each income category in each of the three states, and
the solid circles show the average income level and estimated average support for Bush
for each state. Within each state, richer people are more likely to vote Republican, but
the states with higher income give more support to the Democrats.
be Republicans. Income matters, but so does geography. Individual income is a positive
predictor, and state average income is a negative predictor, of Republican presidential
vote support. The graph (which is related to plots developed for examining variation
in medical statistics; see Baker and Kramer (2001), and Wainer (2002)) simultaneously
displays variation within and between states that would be difﬁcult to see simply by
studying regression coefﬁcients.
Varying-Intercept, Varying-Slope Model
As we have just seen, the varying-intercept multilevel model allows us to understand
the positive correlation of individual income with Republican support, in the context of
countervailing patterns between states. Our next step is to allow the relation between
income and voting to vary by state. We ﬁt a multilevel varying-intercept, varying-slope
logistic regression:
Pr ( yi =1) = log it−1(αs[i] + βs[i]xi), for i = 1, . . . , n, (1)
where s[i] represents the state where respondent i lives and xi is the respondent’s income
(on the −2 to +2 scale). The state-level intercepts and slopes that are themselves mod-
eled given average state incomes and region indicators, with group-level errors (that is,
unexplained state-level variation in intercepts and slopes) having mean 0 and covari-
ance matrix estimated from data. By including region and average income as state-level
predictors, we are not requiring the intercepts and slopes to vary linearly by income













































Figure 4. From the multilevel logistic regression model with varying intercepts and
slopes ﬁt to Annenberg poll data from 2000 to 2004: probability of supporting Bush
as a function of income category, for a rich state (Connecticut), a middle-income state
(Ohio), and a poor state (Mississippi). The open circles show the relative proportion (as
compared to national averages) of households in each income category in each of the
three states, and the solid circles show the average income level and estimated average
support for Bush for each state. Income is a very strong predictor of vote preference in
Mississippi, a weaker predictor in Ohio, and only weakly predicts vote choice at all in
Connecticut. See Figure 5 for estimated slopes in all 50 states, and compare to Figure 3,
in which the state slopes are constrained to be equal.
within region — the error terms s allow for deviation from the model — but rather
are allowing the model to ﬁnd such linear relations to the extent they are supported by
the data.
From this new model, we indeed ﬁnd strong variation among states in the role of
income in predicting vote preferences. Figure 4 recreates Figure 3 with the estimated
varying intercepts and slopes. As before, we see generally positive slopes within states
and a negative slope between states. What is new, though, is a systematic pattern of the
within-state slopes, with the steepest slope in the poorest state—Mississippi— and the
shallowest slope in the richest state — Connecticut.
In addition, the varying-intercept, varying-slope model improves the ﬁt compared to
the simpler model in which only intercepts vary. In addition to being clear from the
consistent patterns in the graphs, a formal comparison shows that allowing the slopes
to vary reduces the deviance information criterion (DIC) by 74 and 53 for the analyses
from 2000 to 2004, respectively.9
Figure 5 shows the estimated slopes for all 50 states and reveals a clear pattern,
with high coefﬁcients — steep slopes — in poor states and low coefﬁcients in rich
9 DIC is ameasure of ﬁt that automatically adjusts for the number of parameters in amodel; a decrease
in DIC implies an estimated improvement in a model’s out-of-sample predictions, not merely an
improved ﬁt to observed data (Spiegelhalter et al. 2004).
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Figure 5. Estimated coefﬁcients for incomewithin state plotted vs. average state income,
for the varying-intercept, varying-slope multilevel model ﬁt to the Annenberg survey
data from 2000 to 2004.
states. Income matters more in red America than in blue America. Or, to put it
another way, being in a red or blue state matters more for rich voters than for poor
voters.
The large sample size of the Annenberg survey makes it easy to estimate a varying-
slope model. However, the survey was not done before 2000. To see how varying state
income effects have changed over time, we turn to exit polls. Figure 6 replicates Figure 4
for the years 1984–2004. The generally positive slopes within states have persisted for
decades, but only since 1992, and especially since 1996, have systematic differences
between rich and poor states become so clear.10
Figures 7 and 8 show the estimated intercepts αs and slopes βs inModel 1 as a function
of average state income for each presidential election year since1984. The estimates vary
from year to year, but we again see the strongest patterns since 1996: poor states have
become consistently more Republican, and the coefﬁcients for income have been higher
in these states.11
We performed some model checking with both the Annenberg and exit polls, com-
paring individual states to the ﬁtted models. A natural concern is nonlinearity or even
10 A problem with ﬁtting state-by-state models here is that the exit polls use cluster sampling (see
Footnote 6), and so technically our logistic regressions, which assume independence among data
within a state, is inappropriate. Essentially, we must interpret the resulting estimates for each state
as applying to the selected clusters rather than to the entire state. We trust the general patterns,
however, because we are interested in the general patterns of income and vote preference comparing
rich and poor states.
11 The multilevel model shrinks the state estimates toward the estimated group-level regression lines.
In a year such as 2000 where intercepts and slopes are shrunk very strongly toward the ﬁtted lines,
this does not mean that we are certain that all 50 states fall along these lines, but rather that the data
are consistent with the ﬁtted lines, and the multilevel model ﬁnds this pattern. That is, we believe
there is a strong (negative) correlation between intercept and average state income, and between
slope and average state income, even though any of the particular states might not fall exactly on
these ﬁtted lines.






















































































Figure 6. Using exit poll data from 1984 to 2004, results for the varying-intercept,
varying-slopemultilevel logistic regression. The curves show the probability of support-
ing Bush as a function of income category, within states that are poor, middle-income,
and rich.
non-monotonicity in the relation between income andRepublican voting, either in aggre-
gate or within states. In most states there were no serious departures from approximate
linearity, and binned residual plots (Gelman et al. 2000) did not reveal problems with the
ﬁtted logistic regression model. (In contrast, had we stopped at the varying-intercept
model shown in Figure 3, we would have found big problems with the model ﬁt, most
notably in the extreme income categories in the richest and poorest states.)
Ethnicity and Other Demographic Variables
Could the varying income effects we have shown be merely a proxy for race? This is
a potentially plausible story. Perhaps the high slope in Mississippi reﬂects poor black
Democrats and rich white Republicans, while Connecticut’s ﬂatter slope arises from its







































































































































































































































































































Figure 7. For the varying-intercept, varying-slope logistic regressions of Republican
presidential vote preference on individual income: estimated state intercepts plotted vs.
average state income. Models ﬁt separately to exit poll data from each election year.
more racially homogeneous population. To test this, we replicate our analysis, dropping
all African–American respondents. This reduces our key pattern by about half. For
example, in a replication of Figure 5, the slopes for income remain higher in poor
states than in rich states, but these slopes now go from about 0.2 to 0 rather than
from 0.4 to 0.
To see if the income patterns could be explained by other demographic variables, we
went back to the full dataset for the Annenberg surveys in 2000 and 2004 and added
individual-level predictors for female, black, four age categories, and four education
categories; and group-level predictors for percent black and average education in each
state. After controlling for all these, the patterns for income remained: within states,
the coefﬁcient for individual income on probability of Republican vote was positive,
with steeper slopes in poorer states; after controlling for the individual and group-level
predictors, richer states supported the Democrats.




















































































































































































































































































































Figure 8. For the varying-intercept, varying-slope logistic regressions of Republican
presidential vote preference on individual income: estimated state slopes plotted vs.
average state income. Models ﬁt separately to exit poll data from each election year.
Our varying-intercept, varying-slope model has thus redeﬁned the puzzle: in asking
why the patterns within states differ from those between states, we are speciﬁcally inter-
ested in why slopes have become so shallow in rich states — that is, what’s the matter
with Connecticut? We have found that the differences between rich and poor states have
become much more prominent in the past 10 years, that they cannot simply be explained
by race, and that they cannot be explained by the set of demographic variables that are
typically used in adjusting survey respondents.
This is not to say that income is causing support for Republicans (or that such a causal
relation is stronger in Mississippi than in Connecticut), but rather that richer voters
within any state are more likely to support the Republicans, even after controlling for
basic demographic variables — and this pattern is strong in poor states but weak in rich
states.
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DISCUSSION
Explaining the Differences Between States
As summarized in Figures 4–8, our multilevel analysis reveals three patterns that we
would like to understand:
1. Voters in richer states support the Democrats — even though, within any given
state, richer voters tend to support the Republicans.
2. The slope within a state — the pattern that richer voters support the Republi-
cans — is strongest in poor, rural, Republican-leaning red states and weakest in
rich, urban, Democrat-leaning blue states.
3. These patterns have increased in the past 10 or 15 years.
Wehaveno conclusive explanations for these patterns—our contribution is to discover
and highlight them — but we can consider some ideas. First, the positive slopes within
states are no surprise — given both the history and the policies of the two parties, it
makes sense that the Democrats would do better among the poor and the Republicans
among the rich, a pattern that has persisted for decades. At the same time, votes are
far from being determined economically — even in Mississippi, which is the state with
strongest correlation between income and voting, over 30%of voters in the lowest income
category support the Republicans. Income is one of the many factors contributing to
voters’ ideological and partisan worldviews, and one could, for example, use detailed
survey data to try to understand individual-level positive correlation of income and
Republican vote choice as coming from differential attitudes toward redistribution, as
discussed by McCarty et al. (2006). Finally, about half of the pattern is explained by
race: African–Americans mostly live in poorer states and themselves tend to be poorer
and vote for Democrats.
Also interesting are the recent differences between rich and poor states that have
gone in the other direction. Having ruled out the most obvious explanation — that rich
and poor states represent the preferences of rich and poor voters — it makes sense to
consider systematic differences between states, which are particularly interesting given
the increasing mobility of Americans, the possibilities of self-stratiﬁcation in exposure
to news media and choosing where to live, and the increasing polarization of states and
counties (Klinkner 2004). One direction is to separately analyze rural, suburban, and
urban voters: replicating our analysis in this way revealed varying-slope patterns (as in
Figure 8) within each group.
Another way of looking at this is to consider state average income as a proxy for
secularism or some kind of cosmopolitanism. In other words, the cultural or social
conservatism of states may be increasingly becoming negatively correlated with average
income. At the same time, if these social issues are increasingly important to voters
(perhaps made more salient by Clinton’s scandals, as suggested by Fiorina et al. (2005)),
this would induce changes in the relation between state income and individual vote. It
would be interesting to study the relation between income and factors such as church
attendance in different states.
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Or, to put it another way, economic issues might well be more salient in poorer states
such as Mississippi, and so one would expect voting to be more income-based. Con-
versely, in richer states like Connecticut, voters are more likely to follow non-economic
cues. (These issues are raised by Ansolabehere et al. (2006), although without the focus
on comparing rich to poor states.) In any case, a challenge for explanations of this sort
is to understand why they become more relevant in the 1990s, given that the relative
rankings of states by income have changed little in the past century. Journalists have also
picked up on the 1990s as pivotal in voters’ changing perceptions of the two parties (see,
for example, Marlantes (2004), and Bishop (2004)), and these perceptions are increas-
ingly important as the lens through which voters view political and economic issues
(Bafumi 2004). As discussed by Fiorina et al. (2005), diverging ideological positions of
the parties can lead to diverging attitudes about the parties among voters, even if the
voters themselves remain largely centrist and do not show strong patterns of consistency
in issue attitudes (Baldassarri and Gelman 2007).12
The Perils of Summarizing Categories by Typical Members;
First- and Second-Order Availability Biases
As a result of the electoral college system and also, perhaps, because of the appeal of
colorful maps, state-level election results are widely presented and studied. After seeing
the pattern of richer coastal states supporting the Democrats and poorer states in the
south and middle of the country supporting the Republicans — a pattern that has
intensiﬁed in recent years (see Figure 1)— it is natural to personify the states and assume
that the Democrats have the support of richer voters too. Psychologists have studied the
human tendency to think of categories in terms of their typical members; for example,
a robin and a penguin are both birds, but robins are perceived of as typicalmembers of the
bird category and penguins are not (Rosch 1975, Rosch andMervis 1975).When looking
at the electoral map, commentators are misled by the patterns in red and blue states into
thinking of typical Republican and Democratic voters as having the characteristics of
these states.13
If we had to pick a “typical Republican voter,” he or she would be an upper-income
resident of a poor state, and the “typical Democratic voter” would conversely be a lower-
income resident of a rich state. But these are more subtle concepts, not directly readable
off the red–blue map — and, in any case, we would argue that given the diversity among
supporters of either party, choosing typical members is misleading.
12 Similar patterns of varying slopes for individual income have been found in state-level analysis of
Mexican presidential elections (Cortina et al. 2007) and in a cross-national analysis of legislative
elections (Huber and Stanig 2006).
13 Political scientists have alsomade the point that the division into red and blue is somewhat unnatural,
considering that distributions of votes and issue preferences tend to be unimodal, with most voters,
andmost states, falling in themiddle of the distribution (Ansolabehere et al. 2006,Fiorina et al. 2005).
Here we are making a slightly different point, which is that a typical Republican (or Democratic)
state does not look like an aggregation of typical Republican (or Democratic) voters.
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In addition to the challenge of trying to summarize diverse groups by their typical
members, journalists who compare Democrats and Republicans are subject to another
cognitive illusion — the availability heuristic, which is the pattern of making judg-
ments based on easily remembered experiences rather than population data (Tversky
and Kahneman 1974).
In this case, we could speak of ﬁrst-order and second-order availability biases.
A national survey of journalists found that about twice as many are Democrats as Repub-
licans (see Poyner Online (2003), summarizing the work of Weaver et al. (2003)). Pre-
sumably their friends and acquaintances are also more likely to support the Democrats,
and a ﬁrst-order availability bias would lead a journalist to overestimate the Democrats’
support in the population, as in the notorious quote (mistakenly) attributed to the ﬁlm
critic Pauline Kael in 1972: “I can’t believe Nixon won. I don’t know anybody who voted
for him” (see Rubio 2004). Political journalists are well aware of the latest polls and
election forecasts and are unlikely to make such an elementary mistake.
However, even a well-informed journalist can make the second-order error of assum-
ing that the correlations they see of income and voting are representative of the pop-
ulation.14 Journalists are predominantly college graduates and have moderately high
incomes (median salary in 2001 of $44,000, compared to a national average of $36,000;
see Weaver et al. 2003) — so it is natural for them to think that higher-income voters
such as themselves tend to be Democrats, and that lower-income voters whom they do
not know are Republicans. In fact, a national survey of journalists ﬁnds a correlation
between high income and support for the Democrats,15 which is consistent with the latte
Democrat, Nascar Republican storyline although not representative of the country as a
whole, where Republicans are, on average, richer than Democrats.
Another form of availability bias is geographic. The centers of national journalistic
activity are relatively rich states includingNewYork, California,Maryland, andVirginia.
Once again, the journalists — and, for that matter, academics — avoid the ﬁrst-order
availability bias: they are not surprised that the country as a whole votes differently
from the residents of big cities. But they make the second-order error of too quickly
generalizing from the correlations in their states. As we have discussed earlier, richer
counties tend to support the Democrats within the “media center” states but not, in
general, elsewhere. And as shown in Figure 5, richer voters support the Republicans just
14 We use the term “second-order” because this bias does not involve inference about a frequency
(that is what we refer to as ﬁrst-order availability bias, for example thinking that muggings are more
likely if you have been mugged, or thinking that cancer is rare because you do not know anyone
with cancer), but rather inference about a correlation (for example, that richer people are more
likely to vote for the Democrats). Correlation, or more precisely covariance, is a second moment
in statistical terms E((x − µx)(y − µy)), as compared with simple frequencies E(x) which are ﬁrst
moments. What we have termed the “second-order availability bias” is related to the systematic
errors in estimation of covariation that have been found by cognitive psychologists (see, for example,
Chapter 5 of Nisbett and Ross, 1980).
15 For example, in the Weaver et al. (2003) survey, 37% of Democratic journalists reported incomes
exceeding $50,000, compared to only 24% of Republican journalists. Much of this difference pre-
sumably arises because better-paid journalists tend to live in big cities which are politically liberal,
but for our purposes here what is relevant is the correlation itself, not where it comes from.
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about everywhere, but this pattern is much weaker — and thus easier to miss — within
these states.
Much has been written in the national press about the perils of ignoring red America,
but these second-order availability biases may have done just that, in a more subtle way.
At this point, our hypotheses about journalistic biases are purely speculative; however, we
hope these ideas can lead to a clearer picture, not only of the correlations between income,
voting, and other variables, but of public understanding of these correlations. Future
work in this area could include further analysis of journalists’ beliefs and attitudes, along
with studies of average citizens’ perceptions of Democrats and Republicans, and how
these perceptions differ by state.
Representation, Ideology, and Authenticity
I come from Huntington, a small farming community in Indiana. I had an
upbringing like many in my generation — a life built around family, public
school, Little League, basketball and church on Sunday. My brother and I
shared a room in our two-bedroom house.
—Dan Quayle, 1992
Clinton displays almost every trope of blackness: single-parent household,
born poor, working-class, saxophone-playing,McDonald’s-and-junk-food-
loving boy from Arkansas.
—Toni Morrison, 1998
Income is not the driving factor in politics in the United States. However, income is
important in political perceptions and is also clearly relevant to a wide range of policies
includingminimumwage regulation, tax rates, Social Security, etc., and is also correlated
with many measures of political participation (Verba et al. 1995). Similarly, geography
is not an all-important factor in politics: red/blue maps of elections are appealing, but
most of the states are not far from evenly divided. But, once again, geography is highly
relevant to decisions on government spending, among other policies.
As the above quotations illustrate, both income and geography are relevant to politi-
cians’ claims of authenticity, just as the income and geography of a candidates’ supporters
are used to signify political legitimacy. In the 2000 presidential election, richer states
voted for the Democrat. The recognition of this fact, and especially this long-term
trend, was correctly noted by prominent journalists and pundits like David Brooks.
But they went a step too far by attributing properties of red and blue states to red
and blue voters and constructing inappropriate pictures of typical Republicans and
Democrats. The psychological notion of typicality and the second-order availability bias
discussed above give us insight as to how journalists could make this error, and the
ongoing issues of authenticity and legitimacy explain why this error can have political
consequences.
Sociologists and political scientists such asBrooks andBrady (1999), Stonecash (2000),
McCarty et al. (2002), and Bartels (2006) have recognized that higher-income voters
continue to support Republican candidates, and lower-income voters supportDemocrats
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(in fact, this trend has been increasing since the 1950s). They have shown less interest
in state-level differences in preferences (with notable exceptions being the Erikson et al.
1993, study of state opinions and state policies, and the comparison of party identiﬁcation
among rich and poor voters within states inMcCarty et al. (2006)). As we have seen, state
income is an important predictor of voting behavior in presidential elections, especially
for people on the higher end of the income scale. Journalists’ focus on red/blue maps
has been somewhat misguided, but the differences between states are real, and indeed
have changed in recent decades.
Geography matters politically. States are not merely organizational entities — mere
folders that divide individuals for convenience. Nor are the differences cosmetic: a y’all
here, a Hahvahd Yahd there. No–states have real, signiﬁcant cultural and political differ-
ences. And despite the centripetal tendencies of a national media, drastically lower trans-
portation costs, and a consumer economy frequently indistinguishable along regional
lines (Starbucks everywhere) — regional political differences seem, if anything, to be
getting more pronounced in the last decade or two.
To the extent political scientists want to understand political behavior in a federal
system, we must recognize these differences. From a politician’s perspective, given poli-
cies will be received differently in various states, even though those states are internally
diverse. Therefore, an incentive to target policy geographically exists and has only gotten
stronger. For policy analysts, then, increased attention to geography is also warranted.
The technique of multilevel modeling has allowed us to understand these patterns
together. Individual income is positively correlated with Republican voting preference,
but average state income is negatively correlated with aggregate state presidential voting
for Republicans. The apparent paradox is no paradox at all, because Figure 4 clearly
shows that these are not mutually exclusive relationships.
We can understand the state average income effect as one of context. The Mississippi
electorate is more Republican than that of Connecticut; so much so that the richest
segment ofConnecticutians is only barelymore likely to voteRepublican than the poorest
Mississippians. In poor states, rich people are very different from poor people in their
political preferences. But in rich states, they are not.
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